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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NORTH DAVIS BANK, a Utah
banking corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
C. RICHARD BARBER and
DAN R. FOGLE,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
12229

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Respondent North
Davis Bank, hereinafter referred to as "Bank," against
two Defendants, C. Richard Barber and Dan R. Fogle.
The Complaint is set out in three causes of action, only
the third of which (R. 2) effects the Appellant here,
hereinafter referred to as "Fogle." The action, as it effects this Appellant, is based upon the agreement of
1

Fogle to purchase sand and aggregate from Defendant
Richard Barber and to pay therefor to the Bank, to
apply to the obligation of Barber to the Bank (Plt's Ex.
B at R. 8), the sum of Five Thousand Four Hundred
Fifteen Dollars ($5,415.00) together with interest. A
copy of the said agreement is attached to Plaintiff's
Complaint ( R. 3, 4) and also is included in the record
as Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" ( R. 8) . Defendant Dan R.
Fogle died during the pendency of this action and be·
fore trial, and by stipulation of the parties, his surviving
widow, Alta M. Fogle, was substituted as Defendant
for the said Dan R. Fogle for the purposes of trial.
Defendant C. Richard Barber apparently was not
served and did not file any responsive pleadings. Counsel is informed and believes that he had been adjudicated
a bankrupt.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The District Court of the Second Judicial District,
in and for Davis County, The Honorable Thornley Swan
presiding, made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of '
Law (R. 9-12), finding that Fogle was indebted to the
Bank as prayed in Plaintiff's Complaint, and concluding that Plaintiff Bank was entitled to judgment thereon and pursuant thereto, entered its judgment (R. 13,
14) granting judgment against Appellant Alta M.
Fogle, as substitute Defendant for Dan R. Fogle, in the
amount, including interest and attorney's fees, of Five

1

2

Thousand Seven Hunderd Four and 24/100 Dollars
($5,704.24).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On appeal, the Respondent seeks that this Court
affirm the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
the Judgment rendered by the trial Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In May of 1966 the Defendant (Appellant on this
Appeal) Dan R. Fogle and Edwin L. Stromberg (an
officer of the North Davis Bank) went to the Glover
Sand and Gravel Pit in Davis County, Utah. (R. 13).
At the sand pit Mr. Stromberg, for the purpose of
measurement, stepped-off two large piles of sand and
aggregate which had been processed and stockpiled at
the Glover pit. ( R. 15) .
Subsequently, on July 11, 1966, the Appellant Dan
R. Fogle executed an agreement to obtain and secure a
bank loan with the North Davis Bank (Pit's Ex. A) .
Under the terms of the agreement, Fogle was paid
$5,415.00 in order to purchase the sand stockpiled at the
Glover pit, and contracted to "complete the use or removal of the sand" and make payment to the Bank on
the loan (at the rate of 501/2 cents per ton) on or before
July 31, 1967. Under the terms agreed upon by Fogle
and the Bank, the $5,415.00 loan from the Bank was to
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be paid off at 7% interest in full, no later than 60 days
after the month the sand was used or removed, or in any
event no later than the final date recited in the agreement, which was July 31, 1967. (Plt's. Ex. A, p. 2).
In conjunction with the Bank's loan, the owner of
the sand and aggregate, C. Richard Barber, executed a
bill of sale to the Appellant Fogle, conveying to Fogle
"the sand previously processed and presently stockpiled"
at the Glover pit in Centerville, Utah (Plt's. Ex. B).
The bill of sale was signed by C. Richard Barber and
duly notarized on June 10, 1966.
Respondent will join in the additional statements of
fact as set fourth in Appellants' Brief (pp. 3 to 9) so far
as they are relevant to this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO ADMIT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE
AMOUNT OF SAND AND AGGREGATE REMOVED BY THE APPELLANT.
During the trial, appellant's attorney attempted to
introduce testimony by an employee of the appellant as
to the content of certain business records concerning the
amount of sand sold by the appellant's business ( R. 28) ·
The court properly ruled such testimony to be inadmissible as it was in derrogation of the "best evidence"
rule (R. 29).
4

Appellant's counsel next attempted to introduce
testimony as to what a particular document "purported
lo show" (R. 29, lines 18-21) (the document was a handwritten summary of certain business documents) . The
court again sustained an objection that the business
records themselves were the "best evidence" (R. 29, line
21).
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Next, appellant's counsel attempted to introduce
the handwritten document itself, stating that the original business documents were a record of a one-year operation and that the originals were too voluminous to be
brought into court (R. 30). The trial court again ruled
that the court could not accept the handwritten summary in evidence without the court's having custody of
the original business records ( ". . . the records themselves constitute the best evidence. And they must be
here, and subject to cross-examination.") (R. 30, lines
15-16). Appellant's counsel then proceeded to have the
witness testify from his personal knowledge what the
records would show (R. 30, lines 19-30). Appellant now
alleges (in his brief at page 10) that the Court's refusal
to allow such evidence was prejudicial error to its case.
To support this contention the appellant cites language
from Wigmore on Evidence § 1230, and the Utah case
of State v. Olsen, 75 Utah 583, 287 P. 181 (1930). In
examining the statement by Professor Wigmore, cited
by appellant, in its entire context, the rule is subject to
several qualifications not mentioned by the appellant in
the quoted statement. In addition to the language quoted
by appellant, the text goes on to state:
5

Most courts require, as a condition, that the mass
. . . summarily testified to shall, if the occasion
seems to require it, be placed at hand in court
or at least be made accessible to the oppostin1'.
party in order that the correctness of the etif'.
dence may be tested by inspection if desired or
that the material for cross-examination may be
available. IV Wigmore on Evidence 3d ed.
§1230.

This statement, which is the next sentence after the ,
Wigmore quotation cited by the appellant in his brief
(but deleted by appellant from the brief) , is practically
the language used by the court in ruling the appellant's
summary document to be inadmissible. It appears that
appellant is contending that which is good authority to 1
support his position is not equally good authority to support the trial court's ruling.

Secondly, a close reading of State v. Olsen, supra,
also cited by appellant to support his position, reveals a
situation distinctly different from the one presented to
the trial court in the present case. In the Olson case, the
witnesses were state bank examiners who were charged
with the duty of auditing a bank's books at the bank's
request and were not employees of the defendant, as in
the present case. Furthermore, although the witnesses
did not have the entire books upon which they had based
their audit in the court, they did present to the court's
custody all the records upon which there was a dispute
and volunteered to produce the complete set of books at
defendant counsel's request. Thus, State v. Olsen would
be an excellent case to cite in support of the general rule ,
that:
6

Where the documents in question are voluminous vhe trial court may allow the introduction
of a summary of the documents, if the documents
are present in the court or available to opposin.c;
counsel's inspection for purposes of testing the
accuracy of the summary or for cross-examination. See IV Wigmore on Evidence 3d Ed §1230.
See also, 29 AM. JuR. 2d Evidence§ 458 at 517-18:
. . . it is permissible for a witness to give a summary based on an inspection of a number of documents where the documents are so numerous
... as to make examination of them in the court
impractical, provided of course, the documents
are competent as evidence and they are made accessible to the opposing party in order that the
correctness of the summary may be tested on
cross-examination. (Citations omitted) [Emphasis added.]
Also, 32A C.J.S., Evidence§ 789 at 111 recites:
Where the results of voluminous facts contained
in writings, or of the examination of many books
.... are to be proved and the necessary examination of this documentary evidence cannot be
conveniently or satisfactorily made in court, it
may be made by an expert accountant or other
competent person ... provided the records themselves are properly in evidence or the person
objecting thereto has an opportunitY, to
them ... The admission of such testimony bemg
a matter resting largely in the discretion of the
trial court. [Emphasis added.]
The general rule as stated in ,;vIGMORE, AM. J UR. 2d,
and C.J.S. has also been espoused by the Utah Supreme
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Court on more than one occasion. For example, the case
of Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 Utah 2d 344,
294 P .2d 689 ( 1956), set fourth the conditions un<ler
which "summary" evidence can be introduced in lieu of
the original docwnents. The court in the Sprague case
stated at page 694:
Where original book entries, documents or other
data are so nwnerous, complex or cumbersome
that they cannot be conveniently examined by
the trier of fact, or where it would materiall\·
aid the court and the parties in analyzing such
material, that a competent person who has made
such examination may present such evidence.
This is sub;ect to the limitation that the evidence
must be shown to be developed from records
. . . the competency of which has been established, and the ree,ords must be available for
examination by the opposing parties and the u:itness sub,iect to cross-examination concerniny
such evidence. [Emphasis added.)
In the sprague case the court held that since all of the
documents were "present in the court for inspection"
and the witness was there for cross-examination, the
trial court did not commit error in overruling the objection and receiving the evidence. Id. at 694.

1
A somewhat more recent Utah decision reaffirmed
the rule articulated in Sprague. In Nalder v. Kellogg
Sales Co., 6 Utah 2d 367, 314 P.2d 350 ( 1957), the Utah
Supreme Court required reversal for a trial court's admission of summary evidence and stated at page 353: 1

The exhibit was not showed to have been prepared, nor was it presented by a person compe-
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tent to do so who was subject to cross examination; nor was it based on records or other data
available for exatnination other than exhibits
herein mentioned. It is obvious that [the} exhibit should not have been admitted, and its consideration by the jury could not be other than
prejudicial, requiring reversal of the judgment.
[Emphasis added.}
In reviewing all of the Utah cases on the point and
also all of the customary legal reference works and
treatises, it is impossible to see any merit whatever to
appellant's contention that the handwritten summary
should have been allowed into evidence by the trial court
when the original records upon which the document was
allegedly based were unavailable to the court's and opposing counsel's inspection for accuracy and validity. On
the contrary, all the Utah decisions and all of the learned
treatises support the ruling by the trial court. To rule
otherwise on this point would require a direct overruling
of a well-developed line of Utah cases and an established
point of law.
POINT II
THE QUALITY OF SAND AND AGGREGATE IS TOTALLY IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL TO ANY ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL.
Appellant contends that the trial court was in
error in excluding evidence concerning the "quality" of
sand and aggregate in the transaction which is the sub-
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ject matter of this appeal. However, although he assert<
error for excluding evidence at the trial, even in his briet
appelant does not show to what issue in the case sud
evidence is material or relevant.
It must be pointed out that the plaintiff/respondent
North Davis Bank was not the "seller" of the sand and
the aggregate, but rather the seller of the product wa1
C. Richard Barber, the codefendant (See plaintiffs Ex.
B).

The role of the plaintiff/respondent North
Bank was that of "lender" or financier to Dan R. Fogle
(defendant/appellant) (See plaintiff's Ex. A).
The defendant Dan R. Fogle, who as owner and
operator of Dan R. Fogle Red-E-Mix Co., presumably
had considerable experience and expertise in the cement
manufacturing business ( R. 11), went to the Glover
Sand pit in Davis County, Utah, accompanied by Edwin
L. Stromberg (an officer of the North Davis Bank) in
May of 1966 (R. 13) and there observed a quantity of
sand and aggregate stockpiled upon the premises which
later on June 10, 1966, was sold to the defendant Dan
R. Fogle as evidenced by a bill of sale between Fogle
and C. Richard Barber (see plaintiff's Ex. B) and a loan
agreement for the purchase price entered into by him
and the North Davis Bank (see plaintiff's Ex. A).
No evidence at all was introduced to indicate that
the bank made any representations whatever to the buy·
er, Dan R. Fogle, concerning the "quality" of the sand
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or aggregate. On the contrary, it is not the function of
the financier to inspect and warrant the quality of commodities a loan applicant wishes to purchase. It is usually the case that the party desiring to purchase a particular commodity (which is both fungible and subject
to price fluctuations) furnishes the expertise to convince
the financier that such a purchase would be both a wise
investment for the purchaser and a secure investment for
the lender.
In the case at hand appellant attempts to create the
bazaar notion that the money lender whose business is
banking took advantage of the buyer whose business is
sand, gravel, cement, and concrete and encouraged him
to buy sand and aggregate that was not fit for the purpose for which he, the purchaser, bought it. There exists
no evidence in the trial record to support such a notion,
and defense or recovery on such theory does not have a
basis in any known legal doctrine or concept.
The appellant, in his brief, Argument II, page 11,
asserts:
Appellants submit that while a quality standard
was not spelled out in the agreement, it is implicit
in the dealings of the parties that the product
would at least meet the definition of the product
within the industry in which it was contempla_ted
to be used.
Assuming, arguendo, that the sand or aggregate
was defective or for some reason not suitable for the
buyer's purposes, then the applicable provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code would control. Since appel-
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lants speak in terms of "implicit" and "implied" conch
tions of the product that it be suitable "within the fo.
dustry in which it was contemplated to be used" (Briel
of appellant at p. 11), it is assumed that the appellant h
relying upon the implied warranties of fitness of pur.
pose and merchantability which are embodied in§§ 70A
2-314 and 70A-2-315, of Utah's Uniform Commercial
Code. Although those provisions do provide for implieo
warranties that the goods sold will be fit for ordinari
purposes under most conditions and for specific pur·
poses under certain conditions, all of the remedies af.
forded the buyer are against the seller and not a gains\
the lending institution. In addition,§ 70A-2-316(3) (b)
states where the buyer has had an opportunity to inspecl
the goods, there are no implied warranties for defect1
which such inspection should have revealed. Since the
buyer, Dan Fogle, who was experienced in the busines>
personally inspected the product which he later pur·
chased, he cannot now assert that the product that ht
himself selected and inspected is not fit for the purpost
for which he purchased it. If the quality of the ·sana
and aggregate were inferior, it is not the lending in·
stitution's error or fault. If the appellant, in fact, hai
a valid claim that the product he purchased is not "_pl
for ordinary purposes," this may be ground for an actio11
against the seller, but it certainly cannot be asserteo
against the lender who merely granted him a loan in
order that he could make the purchase.
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POINT III
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
FOUND THE APPELLANT \i\T AS INDEBTED
TO THE RESPONDENT BANK UNDER THE
EXPRESS TERMS OF THE LOAN AGREEMENT.
Cited in Appellant's brief, Point III, at page 13,
are two paragraphs from the loan agreement (between
Fogle and North Davis Bank) (Plaintiff's Ex. A)
which serve as the basic premise upon which appellant
begins to build his entire argument in Point III.
However, the language of the loan agreement that
deals "specifically" with the problem at hand was not
even mentioned by appellant at any point in his brief.
The clauses of the agreement that specifically address
themselves to the problem on appeal read:
The Borrower agrees to use his best efforts in
attempting to remove and use the sand and/ or
aggregate during the 1966 construction season.
However, should this be impossible or financially
impractical by reason of strikes or lack of construction work in the area, the Borrower agrees
that he shall complete the use and removal of
the sand and/ or aggregate not later than July
31, 1967. In the event that the sand and/or aggregate is not used by the end of the 1966 construction season, payment for that used subsequent thereto and prior to July 31, 1967, shall
be made not later than sixty ( 60) days following the last day of the month in which the materials were used.

13

In the event the borrower fails to use the sand
during the 1966 construction season or by J uh
31, 1967, or should he default in the payment,
hereunder, the bank shall have the right to safo.
by the obligation through its remedies as pro·
vided for in the Uniform Commercial Code ot
the State of Utah, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
as amended, and in addition, the defaulting parh
agrees to pay all collection costs, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.

In reading the provisions of the loan agreement thal
give rise to this suit, it is evident on the face of the doc·
ument that one of the express terms of the agreemenl
was that the appellant was to "complete the use or re·
moval of the sand and/or aggregate not later than July
31, 1967" and make payment therefore (plaintiff's Ex. ·
A, page 2, paragraph 4). The respondent is relying on 1
express contractural language and not on any implied
condition.
The contract further provides:

In the event the Borrower fails to use the sand
during the 1966 construction season or by J uh
31, 1967, or should he default in payments here·
under, the bank shall have the right to satist a
the obligation through its remedies as provideJ
under the Uniform Commercial Code. (Plain·
tiqff's Ex. A, page 2, paragraph 4).

It is clear from reading the entire document, rather than

the selected portions cited out of context by the appel·
lant, that Fogle contracted not only to buy the sand bul
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also to use or remove the sand by a certain date (July
31, 1967) and to complete payment on the obligation;
and that "in the event the Borrower [Fogle] failed [to
remoYe the sand and make payment] ... the bank shall
have the right to satisfy the obligation through its remedies ... " It is not necessary that the respondent prove
that appellant used or removed the sand and aggregate
or failed to use or remove it in order to show a breach of
the contract, but it is sufficient to show that the appellant failed to make the proper payment thereon by July
31, 1967. This in itself is sufficient to constitute a breach
of the material provisions of the contract.
In short, the appellant contracted to use or remove
the sand and aggregate at the Glover pit "not later than
July 31, 1967," and pay to the bank 501/2 cents per ton
until the amount of $5,415.00 had been paid to the bank.
It is in evidence that the Appellant, Fogle, took
possession of the sand and aggregate, moved personnel
and equipment to the site and commenced to use, remove
or sell substantial quantities of the product. (R. pp. 5,
9, 28, 36). However, no evidence was adduced that
Fogle did not use, sell or remove all of the sand and
aggregate at the site, as under the contract he had an
affirmative responsibility to do. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the logical inference is that he
did comply with his contractual obligation to use or remove the sand product. There is, however, evidence to
show that he failed to pay the Bank for the same.

That the appellant failed to perform this contractual
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obligation to repay the bank on the loan is in evidenct t
and gives rise to the action by the bank to satisfy the
debt owing on the obligation.

1

B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND
1
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT SAND AND AG.
GREGATE MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THE I
STOCKPILES IN ORDER FOR FOGLE TO I
COMPLETE HIS OBLIGATION UNDER THE :
EXPRESS TERMS OF THE CONTRACT.
Appellant in his Brief at page 15 asserts that "it
would be pure conjecture to try to determine the amount
of material on the property when Fogle took possessioi
..." and cites several ambiguous remarks made at the
trial apparently to support this thesis. (See App. Briel
pp. 14, 15). However, even a cursory examination of the
trial record reveals an abundance of evidence upon which
the Court was able to establish the dimensions of the:
two piles, ergo the amount, of sand and aggregate ma·1
terial contained within them. For example, Edwin
Stromberg testified that he had (in the presence of Dani!
L. Fogle) stepped-off the distance around the individ·
ual piles and found them to be approximately 200xl75xl
20 and 7 5xl50x25 feet respectively ( R. pp. 15-16). He
also testified that he had previously measured his fool·
steps and found them to be very close to exactly 3 feel!
(R. p. 16).
'

Li

John A. Rokich also had occasion to estimate the
proportions of the two stockpiles of sand and estimatea
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them at 150xl25x20 and 75xl25xl5 feet respectively.
(R. pp. 21-22).
In addition, Mr. Dan R. .Fogle, Jr. stated that although the density of sand and aggregate is variable, he
estimated that the sand and aggregate material that he
had observed at the Glover pit was approximately 2,800
lbs. per cubic yard. ( R. p. 16). He further stated that
although sand and aggregate may vary anywhere from
3000 lbs. per cubic yard to 2,200 lbs. per cubic yard, depending upon density, he would not estimate this particular material at less than 2,500 lbs. per cubic yard.
(R. pp. 6-7).
From all the evidence obtained from the various individuals who had opportunity to measure the two piles
in question, the trial Court was able to determine the
minimum dimensions of the two piles at " (a) 125 feet by
75 feet by 15 feet and (b) 150 feet by 125 feet and sloping from a minimum of 5 feet in height at one end to 30
feet in height at the other end." (See Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law at page 10) .
It should be noted that the trial Court's conclusions
were based upon the minimum measurements of the witnesses and not even upon an average of their measurements.

From the evidence taken from the trial record, it is
a relatively simple arithmetical calculation to determine
the amount and value of the sand and aggregate material
of which Dan R. Fogle took possession.
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For example:
Pile (a)
Minimum
Dimensions of pile
Pile (b)
Minimum
Dimensions of pile

125'x 75'xl5'

140, 725 cubic fee

150'xl25'xl2'*

225,000 cubic fe€

* (12' is used as the average

height of the sloping pile
which measured from 30'
to 5')
Total Cubic Feet
365,625
Conversion of cubic
feet to
cubic yards 365,625 divided by 27
30,468 total cubi
yards
minus 30% of 30,468 cubic yards
9,140 total yarc
lost in slo
ing sides
To account for sloping sides of piles
piles.
30468
30%
9140
Total volume after substracting 30%
21,328 adjusted
for sloping sides of piles
total cubi
yards
Minimum net weight of cubic yard of
x2,500
sand/aggregate 2,5,00, lbs.
Total weight in lbs. of all
53,320,000 total lbs.
sand/aggregate
Conversion of lbs. to tons
26,660 total tons
Total tons 53,320,000 divided by 2000 =
x$.50
Value per ton of sand/aggregate at $.50
$13,330.00
Total value of sand/aggregate

As is readily apparent from the above calculatio
even by construing the evidence in the light most favc
able to the Appellant by using the minimum estimat
for all measurements and weights there is still over twi
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as much sand/aggregate as would be necessary for Fogle
lo carry out his contractual obligation.
\Vith regard to the use and removal of the sand/
aggregate Mr. Allan R. Horsley testified that he alone
removed over half of one pile (R. p. 36).
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, of which
the record is completely void, it can only be assumed that
the Fogle operation consummed, used or removed all of
the sand/aggregate as was its contractual obligation and
business to do.

CONCLUSION
This is an action firmly based in contract in which
the documents speak for themselves. That the Appellant Dan R. Fogle, formally entered into a loan agreement with North Davis Bank in order to obtain capital
for the purchase of certain sand and gravel products for
use in his business, is an established fact.

It is undisputed that in accordance with the specific
and express terms of the written contract that the Ap' pellants agreed to completely use and remove the sand
•until the amount of $5,415.00 had been repaid to the
Bank not later than July 31, 1967, thereby satisfying the
loan repayment obligation.

19
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As it is undisputed that the Appellant failed to re. i
pay the $5,415.00, as was specifically agreed upon, thu11
the Bank according to the default and remedies proyi. ·
sion of the contract, properly brought action to recover
the remaining amount owing on the loan.

During the trial the Court properly ruled that evi·
dence, purportedly a summary of sand sales compile<l
from the business records of Fogles Red-E-Mix Co.,
was not admissible under the "best evidence" rule, with·
out the opportunity for the Court and the opposing coun.
sel to examine the original records for accuracy and va. I
lidity. The ruling by the trial court was almost precisely I
the language used by the Utah Supreme Court in cases
dealing with that particular point of law, and is also
squarely in line with the most reliable and authoritative I
learned treatises, such as Wigmore, Am. Jur. and C.J.S. I
To rule otherwise on this point would require reversal
of a well-developed line of Utah cases.

1

l

I

J

Evidence as to the "quality" of the sand products
was correctly excluded as immaterial, as the Bank was
shown to be the "lender" and not the "seller" of the sand:
and the trial court could not find any material issue to
which such qualitative evidence would be probative.
The trial court found that there was over two·
times the necessary amount of sand/ aggregate to carry·
out the express terms of the contract and as discussec
in Point III, supra, the trial Court found the Appellanl
Fogle was indebted to the Respondent, Bank, under
the express and specific written terms of the loan agree·
ment.
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Consequently, the trial Court found the Appellant
was indebted to the Repsondent and rendered judgment
· accordingly. On this appeal Respondent prays affirmation of that judgment.

1

Respectfully submitted,
JAMES P. COWLEY
ROBERT D. MAACK
Attorneys for Respondent,
North Davis Bank
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